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AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE GREEK REVOLUTION, 1821-1833

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INTRODUCTION

The United States has joined hands with foreign allies and fights on foreign soil. The thing is without precedent in her national history. Washington, Jefferson, and other "fathers of the Republic" by precept and example taught the maxim of political isolation from Europe, and thus set the young nation on the road to its"place in the sun". For more than a century and a quarter that guiding principle has been tenaciously held to. Yet - today we find ourselves allied with foreign powers, in a conflict not of our own making.

Rome was not built in a day; the sentiment prompting and supporting America's entrance into the Great War is not the product of a moment. It is a characteristic as old as the policy of "splendid isolation" itself. Nor is this the first occasion upon which the appeal of other nations for liberalism has roused the people of the United States. From time to time their interest and sympathy have been enlisted in the contests for popular governments abroad. That their arms have not until now been put into service has probably been due to the discretion of the national leaders in those crises.

Of these various instances of popular demonstration for a foreign cause none is more interesting and perhaps none less well known to the casual reader of American history than that which took place during the Greek war for independence, 1821-33, when the oppressed natives of Greece finally succeeded in throwing off the hated yoke of Turkish tyranny. The revolutionists ap-

pealed to the peoples and governments of western Europe and to the United States for aid and encouragement. Nowhere else was their cause so enthusiastically championed as in America, and this at the very time when the ancient policy of non-interference was incorporated in the text of our foreign policy, the so-called Monroe doctrine, and was published to the world.

The story of the American reaction to the Greek Revolution is of especial interest now in that it shows a step in the development of that sentiment which enables the nation's spokesman to say, "We must make the world safe for democracy", and have the cry adopted as the national slogan at the time when the strength of our arms is flung into the European conflict.

In the following essay I shall attempt to give an account, by no means exhaustive, of the character and scope of the American interest in the Greek Revolution, as it is portrayed in the correspondence, memoirs, and periodicals of the period. In order to appreciate the movement fully the condition and character of Greece and the situation of the international politics at the outbreak of the revolution must first be understood.

Chapter I

THE SITUATION

To cultured minds of the early nineteenth century, educated as they were in reverence for classic civilization, the very name of Greece possessed a peculiar charm. It called up visions of the beautiful art, the literary excellence, and the ideals of courage and liberty for which posterity is so deeply indebted to the ancient Hellenes.

But the Greece of 1820[1] offered no such charming picture. To be sure, her natural beauties still thrilled the traveller and inspired a Byron, but the dignity of a free and cultured nation was gone, crushed by a succession of barbarian invaders. The last of these was the Seljuk Turk, who for nearly four centuries had "encamped" in the Grecian peninsula, setting the peculiar stamp of his political and social system over the provinces and islands. The courage and fire that once characterized the "mistress of the Aegean" seemed utterly extinguished. In their place reigned poverty, ignorance, and superstitious barbarity. Several of the once proud cities had sunk into mere collections of hovels. Much of the agricultural region was tilled by thriftless peasants only enough to provide a bare subsistence. There was little incentive to progress, for the Sultan's coffers were always

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1. For a general description of Greek conditions in this period see Phillips, Greek War of Independence, Ch.,1,2; Howe, Historical sketch of the Greek Revolution, ch.1; Cambridge Modern History, X, 169-177.

yawning for the products of the land. Not only were the crops exacted from the native inhabitants, but the eldest son of each family was taken into the Sultan's army, to be raised in the Mohammedan faith and civilization, thus becoming a party to the tyranny over his own countrymen; while the Greek girls, noted for the beauty immortalized by Byron, were often forced into slavery or taken to become inmates of Turkish harems.

Travellers in Sultan Mahmud's dominions alternately painted the character of the Greek population in darkest and brightest colors. Those who saw in the natives only ignorance, treachery, and often thievishness, went away convinced that the modern Greeks were no descendants of the ancient Hellenes. Others, of keener and more sympathetic insight, beheld indeed a degraded people who, through hopelessness and fear of the soldiery, often resorted to dishonest means of livlihood, but they also saw more. In the rough bands of hardy spirits who led a tyranny-defying, Robin Hood sort of existence among the mountains they saw elements of courage and energy that bade fair to put up a sturdy fight for their national independence when the opportunity offered itself.

The rashness and weakness of Turkey led to her own undoing. From the first the conquered Greeks were left undisturbed in their orthodox religion, a band not only holding them together, but forming a link with the western world. Then, too, far more than a century the forces of the Sultan had been busy defending his possessions from the outside foes, and in consequence the military pressure within his own territory was lessened.

The natives were quick to take advantage of the opportunity. Signs of surreptitious regeneration were in evidence in many centers at the opening of the century. The modern Greeks retained at least one peculiarity of their ancestors, the thirst for knowledge. Schools and colleges sprang up in spite of drastic measures by the Government, and library funds were started. Through the efforts of a few devoted educators, among them Dr. Kovay, whose literary productions were attracting attention in other countries, the classical language was gradually becoming the spoken tongue. For several years a hundred young men were sent annually to the universities of western Europe, there learning the professions, incidentally imbibing the liberal political ideas then spreading over the continent. The Turks, not being a sea faring people, left the commerce almost entirely in the hands of the Greek sailors and these had become the hardiest and most skilful seamen on the Mediterranean.

The Greeks who were forced to flee from political persecution found refuge in the European armies and there learned the arts of modern warfare. Not a few of the educated young men gained influential positions in the Sultan's diplomatic household. It is small wonder that a people of such potential possibilities chafed under the restraint imposed by a repugnant civilization.

These new tendencies did not pass unnoticed by the rest of the Christian world. Appearing as they did at a time when the spirit of democracy which characterized the social and political development of the nineteenth century was beginning seriously to harass crowned autocracy, the signs of regeneration among the Greeks

excited popular sympathy and admiration in the western countries. Societies were formed to ameliorate the depressed condition in the peninsula; missionaries from both hemispheres carried enlightenment; and disbanded European army officers aided in quietly training the Greek patriots for military service.

While the prudent patriots and friends of Greece were thus laboring to establish her independence through the slow yet certain process of education, the seeds of revolution scattered throughout the continent by France took root on Greek soil, and impatient spirits busily spread the contagion of disaffection. The secret society of the Hetairia Philikke was founded in 1814, ostensibly for educational and industrial purposes, really to launch a rebellion at the first opportune moment. Such a moment was not long delayed.

One peculiarity of the political system of the Mohammedan was the lack of loyalty on the part of the Sultan's provincial governors, the pashas, who, on the slightest provocation, were likely to match their forces against those of the central government. Ali Pasha, the powerful ruler of the Albanian region, revolted against the Sultan in December, 1820. Immediately the strongest divisions of Mahmud's forces were directed against Ali, who retired into his fortress at Janina. To the Hetairia Philikke this seemed a providential opportunity that should be seized even at the cost of better military preparedness. They invited Prince Alexander Ipsilanti, then commanding some of the Russian Czar's forces, to head the revolt. He responded, and with his small band of mercenaries crossed the Pruth. The die was cast. By march

he reached the interior provinces of Greece, where, with an enthusiastic following, he raised the standard of revolt. This in itself would not have been so consequential, for many times the Greeks had risen in like insurrections, and were as many times suprressed with little trouble, but this uprising took place in a peculiarly significant period of the history of international politics. The moment chosen for the beginning of the struggle was auspicious as regards the pre-occupation of the Turkish forces, but it was ill-omened in the light of the general European situation.

In March 1821, the very time Ipsilanti was issuing his rallying cry to his compatriots, the three powers whose pet abomination was liberalism, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, were sitting in Congress at Laybach, cementing an alliance , the purpose of which, as stated in the Trappau Protocol[2] the previous autumn, was frankly that of intervention in the interests of "legitimacy", and the preservation of existing authority from upheaval by insurrection.

The uprising in Greece placed Alexander, the Russian Czar, in a dilemma. On the ~~other~~ one hand his old idealism, augmented by the influence of his minister Capo d' Istrias, a native of Greece and a member of Hetairia Philikke, urged him to interfere in the interests of the orthodox religion; on the other hand, his alliance with Austria and Prussia committed him to a program of European peace, which demanded inaction, if not practical intervention in

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2. Phillips, Conferation of Europe, pp. 218-233.

behalf of the "legitimate" sovereign of Greece.[3] To add to the complexity of the situation, Turkey and Russia had never reached a complete understanding on the question of the treaty of Bucharest, 1812, which gave to Alexander a foothold on the Black Sea to the south of the Caucasus, extended his European boundary to the Pruth, and assured him the right of protection over the autonomous Balkan states.[4] The Sultan had never ratified the treaty.[5] The Czar's Christian subjects wished him to help their suffering brothers in religion, and indeed the Czar himself had long been troubled over the wretched conditions of the Christian Greeks.

The English and Austrian ministers, Castlereagh and Metternich, lost no time in exerting their combined influence on Alexander to prevent his intervention.[6] Although England was not in sympathy with the general scheme of the Holy Alliance as set forth in the protocol, yet she could not view with approval an interference by Russia in the Ottoman Empire. The English people as a whole were in sympathy with the Greek cause, Castlereagh himself was not unsympathetic, but he was urged by practical considerations[7] - fears of the confusion that would result from such interference on the part of the Emperor which might lead not only to

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3. Phillips, Confederation of Europe, pp. 234-250.

4. Cambridge Modern History, X, 169; Martens, Nouvean Recueildes Traite's, III, p. 339.

5. Phillips, Confederation of Europe, pp. 238.

6. Ibid., pp. 234-43; Castlereagh's Despatches and Corres., XII, pp. 403-408.

7. Ibid.,

the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, but to a conflagration of all Europe. The path of England's duty was plain : to prevent any upsetting of the status quo of Europe was infinitely more importance than an altruistic desire to permit intervention in behalf of a cause whose ultimate success was extremely doubtful.

So much for the European situation. On the western side of the Atlantic also affairs were progressing. International complications were gathering about the Department of State, at whose head was John Quincy Adams. In September, 1821, Alexander issued a ukase which asserted that the Pacific coast of North America from Behring Straits to the fifty-first parallel of latitude was exclusively European[8]. The United States' claim placed the boundary at 54°40' north latitude. Naturally, Americans were highly indignant.

In the spring of 1822 the United States Government led the way in recognizing the independence of the Spanish-American colonies, without waiting to see what attitude the European powers would take toward the young republic.[9]

When Canning succeeded to the Foreign Secretaryship of Great Britian in August, 1822, English policy toward the increasingly successful Greek revolutionists remained practically unchanged[10]. The Holy Alliance was not suppressing them, but it was living up to its avowed purpose by holding a congress at

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8. Martens, Nouveau ReCueill, V, Supplement, p. 358.

9. British and Foreign St. Papers, IX, pp. 366-752.

10. Temperley, George Canning, p. 207, Philips, Confederation of Europe, pp. 244-250.

Verona, October 1822, and authorizing an invasion of Spain by French troops to restore absolutism in the Spanish government.[11] That accomplished the Allies could direct their attention to other refractory peoples.

Such, briefly, was the status of international affairs when the question of the Greek revolution demanded the serious attention of the United States, further complicating the diplomatic situation which already began to ruffle the calm of the closing years of the "era of good feeling."

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11. Philips, Confederation of Europe, p. 266; Temperley, George Canning, pp. 152-171.

Chapter II

GREECE AND THE MAKING OF AN "AMERICAN CAUSE"

One of the first acts of the earliest political body organized in Greece after the outbreak of the insurrection, the Messenian Senate at Calamata, was a resolution which declared that , having deliberately resolved to live or die for freedom, they were drawn by an irresistible sympathy to the people of the United States.[1] This was incorporated in a formal address of the senate to the American nation and was forwarded by the Greek committee then sitting in Paris to Edward Everett, editor of the North American Review, At the request of the committee the document was translated and widely circulated throughout the country.[2] In this way the Greek cause was brought directly to the attention of the American people in the first year of the revolution.

For some time there was but little reaction on this side of the Atlantic. Here, as in Europe, the general impression was that the affair would soon "burn itself out beyond the pale of civilization." as Metternich put it, and would end,as so many like attempts had ended, in a more complete subjugation of the Hellenes. But the insurgents were unexpectedly successful. By January of 1822 the Turkish forces were almost completely driven out of the Morea, the most important province of the peninsula, and to the north of the Gulf of Corinth the Greeks held mastery as far as the Gulf of Arta and the Pass of Thermopylae. With so much territory gained, the next pressing problem was that of a

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1. North American Review, XVII, p. 417; Ibid., XVIII, p. 414.
2. Webster, Writings and Speeches, V, p. 60; North American Review XVII, p. 413.

central political organization, the government up to this time having been vested in three local senates. After several preliminary attempts, a workable constitution was promulgated, January 22, and in accordance with its provisions a president, the first of long succession, was elected. On the twenty-seventh of the same month the National Assembly under the new constitution proclaimed the independence of Greece, the first of several such proclamations, to be sure, but yet a step in advance. From a people of vertual slaves the Greeks had become a nation, in name at least, and claiming the rights due an autonomous government. This sufficed to call forth an increasing respect for their efforts.

Then there took place an event that roused the other peoples to active sympathy. This was the massacre at Scio. Early in April the revolting peasantry of the island shut the Turkish garrison in a citadel and held them prisoners. In retaliation the Turkish fleet, which happened to be in the neighborhood, landed several thousand soldiers, burned the city, massacred more than forty thousand inhabitants, carried as many women and children to the slave markets of Smyrna, and wantonly killed several hundred Greek hostages. The once prosperous island of a hundred thousand inhabitants, the most enlightened and peacable community of the Sultan's Greek possessions, was left a desolated ruin. Some refugees escaped to Europe and there told their story. Numbers of children were picked up by the foreign merchant ships, some finding homes in the United States.[3]

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3. Webster, Writings and Speeches, V, p. 60; Port Folio, XVIII, p.77.

Everett wrote: "We have seen, on the wharfs of Boston, the household utensils of brass and copper, gathered from the desolate hearths of the butchered Sciotes, bought as old copper in Smyrna, and as such sent to this country".[4] Probably this mute testimony of the fate of the Sciote homes had its own peculiar appeal to the Bostonians.

A short time afterwards the island of Cyprus suffered a similar fate. The immediate effect of the Sultan's cruelties was to enlist all liberal minded people on both sides of the Atlantic in favor of the independence of Greece as the only means of establishing satisfactory peace in southeastern Europe.

Such was the sentiment throughout the United States that hope for the success of the Greek arms was made the subject of a paragraph in President Monroe's message to Congress , December 1822:

"The mention of Greece fills the mind with the most exalted sentiments and arouses in our bosoms the best feelings of which our nature is susceptible ----- That such a country should have been overwhelmed and so long hidden, as it were, from the world under a gloomy despotism has been the cause of unceasing and deep regret to generous minds for ages past. It was natural, therefore, that the reappearance of those people in their original character, contending in favor of their liberties, should produce that great excitement and sympathy in their favor which has been so signally displayed throughout the United States. A strong hope is entertained that these people will recover their independence

4. No. Am. Review, XVII, pp. 420-421.

and resume their equal station among the nations of the earth."[5]

Three weeks later, in the national House of Representatives, Dwight of Massachusetts presented a memorial signed by one hundred and thirty-eight leading citizens of the District of Columbia, "to appropriate two or three millions in provisions and whatever may be necessary to the Greeks, as an easy and honorable method of acknowledging the aid, bounty, and obligation received from France in like circumstances."[6] This proposal, rather startling as it was in view of the avowed policy of non-intervention which the United States had long consistently held, provoked but one sppech. The theme of that single dissertation was to the effect that the President had already set the limits of our sympathy by the expression of it in his message. The motion was tabled without more ado. Other and more engrossing matters held the attention of the congressmen. Already the question of the next presidental election was commanding attention; the Russian ukase was exciting political circles and the action of the Holy Alliance distracted the minds of many.[7]

Already in European countries private individuals and organized societies were sending money and provisions to the Greek patriots. But more was needed to aid Greece in attaining a position of international dignity. As one of their leaders, Andreas

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5. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II, p. 193.

6. Annals of Congress, 17 Cong., 2 Sess., 457-460.

7. Stratford Canning, British ambassador at Washington summed up the situation to his own satisfaction, at least, in an interesting letter to Sir Charles Bagot, March 30, 1823; See Bagot, Canning and His Friends, II, 163.

Luriottis, wrote: "The Greeks till now have been flattered by a number of private associations who came to their aid; but no government has, as yet, partaken of this generous enthusiasm: and yet, the succours, as well moral as physical, which are necessary for them, cannot be afforded them, but by governments".[8] Accordingly the Greek government sent agents, to the various courts and cabinets, seeking diplomatic recognition. Andreas Luriottis, a prominent Greek, interviewed San Minguel, Spains minister of foreign affairs, in the autumn of 1822. Gaining little encouragement at Madrid he proceeded to London. There he sought out Richard Rush, the United States ambassador. In his despatch to the State Department, February 24, Rush tells of the interview:

"I received the day before yesterday a paper, of which a copy is enclosed, addressed to you by Andreas Luriottis, an agent or deputy from Corinth on behalf of the cause of the Greeks ------ This gentlemen brought me a letter of introduction from General Dearborn, at Lisbon, and I received him in a manner due to the interesting character which he bears. I assured him that the fortunes of his country were dear to the people of the United States -- and that the Government of the United States participated in this feeling ---------- To the enquiries of Mr. Luriottis, whether my Government would open political or diplomatic relations with his at the present day, I replied that this was a point on which I was wholly uninformed and could not undertake to give my opinion ------- Mr. Luriottis dwelt with confidence upon the advances his country has made in the career of independence -- advances the more solid

8. Letter of Greek Agent to the Prime Minister of Spain, Nov. 21, 1822, Am. St. Papers, For Rel. VI, 254-5.

and encouraging as they have been made amidst formidable difficulties by the mere unassisted efforts of her own valor and constancy."[9] The paper enclosed was a letter from Luriottis to Adams, in behalf of Greece:

"I know -- that the sympathies of the generous people of the United States have been extensively directed towards us ---- we would look to their individual if not to their national co-operation. Every, the slightest, assistance under present circumstances will aid the progress of liberty; and if, standing, as we have stood, alone and unsupported ---- if thus we have gone forward, liberating our provinces one after the other, and subduing every force which has been directed against us, what may we not do with the assistance for which we venture to appeal to the generous and the free? ---------- we have organized a Government founded upon popular suffrages; and you will probably have seen how closely our organic law assimilates to that Constitution under which your nation so happily and so securely lives ------- I have been sent hither by the Government of Greece to obtain assistance in our determined enterprise -----I should have been wanting to my duty had I not addressed you, supplicating the earliest display of your amicable purposes; entreating that diplomatic relations may be established between us; communicating the most earnest desires of my Government, that we may be allowed to call you allies as well as friends; and stating that we shall rejoice to enter upon discussions which may lead to immediate and advantageous treaties, and to receive as to expedite diplomatic agents without delay."[10]

9. Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., VI, p. 255-6.
10. Ibid., 256.

Adams' reply was not made for several months. Other international questions were pressing themselves upon his attention. The Russian question was not yet settled, and, to make matters worse, that country seemed disinclined to follow the example set by the United States in recognizing the South American republics. Not only that, but the continental Powers were planning a congress to consider aiding Spain in bringing the colonies back under her control.

England herself had recognized Greece as a belligerent in March, but had no intention of aiding the revolutionists. From a correspondent in Marseilles, and through Middleton, the United States envoy to St. Petersburg, Secretary Adams obtained information concerning the prospects of the revolutionists - information which evidently convinced him that the hopes of their ultimate success were not so sanguine and the foundation of their government not so secure, as Luriottis' note indicated.[11]

This information, together with the document from Rush and a despatch from Gallatin, then Minister to France, Adams submitted to the consideration of the President and Cabinet on August 15. In his communication Gallatin proposed that the United States should assist Greece with the naval force then in the Mediterranean, a frigate, a corvette, and a schooner.[12] In view of the fact that we had at that time no treaty with Turkey, and because of their avowed enthusiasm for the Greek cause, Crawford, Secretary

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11. Am. St. Papers, For. Rel. p. 258. 260.

12. Schurz, Henry Clay, II, pp. 208-209; Adams, Memoirs VI, 173.

of Treasury, and Calhoun, the War Secretary, were inclined to accept Gallatin's suggestion. But no course of action could be decided upon.

In his diary Mr Adams wrote of this discussion: "Mr. Crawford and Mr. Calhoun inclined to countenance this project ----- Their enthusiasm for Greece is all sentiment, and the standard of this is the prevailing popular feeling. As for action, they are seldom agreed, and after two hours of discussion this day the subject was dismissed, leaving it precisely where it was -- nothing determined, and nothing practicable proposed by either of them. Seeing their drift, I did not think it necessary to discuss their doubts whether we were at peace with Turkey, their contempt for the Sublime Porte, or their enthusiasm for the cause of the Greeks ---- ----- I told the President I thought not quite as lightly of a war with Turkey ------ He had proposed a --------secret agent to Greece-----but we cannot send a secret Agent. Our Agents will never be secret."[13] And so, in this case as in many others, it devolved upon Secretary Adams to outline a positive program. Accordingly, he gave his answer to Luriottis' proposition, enclosing it in a note to Rush, August 18, bidding the latter deliver it to the Greek agent in person, "accompanied with such remarks and explanations as may satisfy him, and those whom he represents, that, in declining the proposal of giving active aid to the cause of Grecian emancipation, the Executive Government of the United States has been governed, not by its inclinations or sentiment of indif-

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13. Adams, Memoirs, VI, 173.

ference to the cause, but by its constitutional duties, clear and unequivical." The note then went on to state that the only way in which the United States could give assistance would be by application of some portion of their public force or public revenue, and such action would constitute them in a state of war with the Ottoman Porte, and perhaps with Barbary Powers; as to giving diplomatic recognition, the United States had always recognized only the fact of sovereignty, regardless of the question of right, and the status of the Greeks did not yet admit of recognition on that principle.[14]

The note to Luriottis himself expressed cordial encourgement and goodwill, but explained that "the United States are forbidden by the duties of their situation from taking part in the war to which their relation is that of neutrality. At peace themselves with all the world, their established policy and the obligations of the laws of nations preclude them from becoming voluntary auxiliaries to a cause which would involve them in war."[15] This note was not delivered until February, 1824, after our Government had made known its foreign policy through other channels.[16]

A few days previous to these cabinet discussions concerning relations to Greece Canning had begun to make his famous overtures to Rush, his proposed scheme of concerted action on the part of the United States and Great Britian in regard to the young

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14. Am. St. Papers, For Rel., VII, p. 257.

15. Ibid.,

16. Rush, A Residence at the Court of London, II, pp.98-99.

South American republics. This added a new question to the already lengthy list of diplomatic problems. President Monroe, by nature a rather timid man, and at this time in poor health, was sorely perplexed. He turned to his old political masters, Jefferson and Madison, for advice.[17] In his reply to his letters the former counselled pursuance of a course of action entirely divorced from England or any other European state, and as to European affairs, "our first and fundamental axiom should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe."[18] Madison was for a plan of co-operation: "Will it not be honorable to our country and possibly not altogether in vain to invite the British Govt to extend the 'avowed disapprobation' of the project agst the Spanish Colonies to the enterprise of France agst Spain herself, and even to join in some declaratory act in behalf of the Greeks? On the supposition that no form could be given to the act clearing it of a pledge to follow it up by war, we ought to compare the good to be done with the little injury to be apprehended by the United States, shielded as their interests would be by the former and the fleets of G. Britain united with their own. These are questions, however, which may require more information than I possess, and more reflection than I can now give them."[19] Here, at least, were expres-

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17. Monroe, Writings, VI, pp. 323-5.

18. Jefferson, Writings, X, p. 277.

19. Madison, Works, IX, p.157. Madison also wrote to Jefferson and Rush in the same strain -- See Works, IX, p. 159. The Monroe-Jefferson-Madison correspondence is brought together in Moore's Digest of International Law, VI, pp. 393-7.

sions from men not influenced by political considerations, but as the suggestions were diametrically opposed in substance, the question was no nearer settlement than before.

While this correspondence was taking place Secretary Adams was preparing drafts of replies to Canning's propositions and to Czar Alexander's Ukase relating to the American continents. These replies clearly set forth the doctrine that the United States would avoid even the appearance of interference in Continental affairs, and would expect the converse from European powers. Monroe expressed his entire approbation of the doctrine, yet whether he fully understood the scope and significance is open to question, for, a few days after expressing his approval of the Secretary's interpretation of our foreign relations, in calling a cabinet meeting for November 21 he wrote to the members: " I mean to bring under consideration---- the important question, whether any, and if any, what notice, shall be taken of Greece, and also of the invasion of Spain by France."[20] At that meeting he submitted for discussion the first draft of his message to Congress. To Adams alarm it "contained a broad acknowledgement of the Greeks as an independent nation, and a recommendation to Congress to make an appropriation for sending a minister to them."[21] Dismayed at the thought of the consequences

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20. Ford, "The Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine", Proceedings Mass. Hist. Society, XV, p. 392; Ford, John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine", Am. Hist. Review, VIII, p. 40.

21. Adams, Memoirs, VI, p. 194.

such a message would have on Europe, Adams pronounced it" a summons to arms -- to arms against all Europe, for objects exclusively European -- Greece and Spain."[22] He urged that if the Holy Alliance was determined to intervene in South America, to take issue with the United States, which seemed not at all impossible, " if they intend now to interpose by force, we shall have as much as we can do to prevent them, without going to bid them defiance in the heart of Europe."[23] The President promised to reconsider the paragraph.

On the next day, November 22, Gallatin had a conference with Secretary Adams. Gallatin, just returned from the legation at Paris, was full of enthusiasm for the Hellenic Cause. Again he proposed, " as if he was serious", sending two or three frigates to assist the Greeks in destroying the Turkish fleet, and a loan or subsidy of two million dollars. A day or so later he pressed his scheme upon the President himself. As to why Gallatin so ardently championed the Greek cause Adams comments in his own inimitable way: "As he is neither a fool nor an enthusiast, and knows very well that no such thing will be done, I look for the motives of this strange proposal and find them not very deeply laid. Mr. Gallatin still builds castles in the air of popularity, and, being under no responsibility for consequences, patronizes the Greek cause for the sake of raising his own reputation."[24]

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22. Adams, Memoirs, VI, p. 194

23. Ibid., p. 197.

24. Memoirs, VI, p. 198.

Adam's clear-cut, forceful reasoning, however, overruled Monroe's personal desires and the prompting of his other advisers. When the President's message appeared, December 2, it contained a paragraph on the Greek cause, asserting that "A strong hope has long been entertained, founded on the heroic struggle of the Greeks, that they would succeed in their contest and resume their equal station among the nations of the earth ------Although no power has declared in their favor, yet none, according to our information has taken part against them ----- From the facts which have come to our knowledge there is good cause to believe that their enemy has lost forever all dominion over them, that Greece will become again an independent nation. That she may obtain that rank is the object of our most ardent wishes." Then, to set forth a positive line of conduct, the message asserted a policy which has since become famous as the "Monroe Dcotrine."

" In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it compart with our policy to do so ---------- Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adapted at an early stage of the wars which so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us."[25]

But the Greeks themselves managed to find comfort in the few lines of sympathy. The President's words were seized upon

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25. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II, pp. 207.

with delight and made the basis of many fond hopes. "Reflect", said one of them in an address to their Senate, "Reflect, gentlemen, on the feelings and language, with which the people of Franklin hail the dawn of our regeneration . Listen to that generous voice, which from the curule chair of their first magistrate, expressed aloud, before earth and its monarchs, the prayers of humanity!" They were constantly receiving encouragement from Europeans, but there it was only the people who expressed their approbation of the cause. In America it was different.

"In America are no despots to bind; there, the government is the servant of the people; and surely the cause that the sovereign people approve and pray for, the sovereign people will support."[26]

As to whether the sovereign people would initiate active measures, remained to be seen. As far as Executive action was concerned the matter was settled; that department had promulgated what Adams had designated an "American Cause",- a cause which permitted of no action such as Luriottis had entreated. An entry made in his diary during the period of cabinet discussion best illustrates the view held by the able leader of the State department; "Something had been said yesterday, that if the President did not recommend the recognition of the independence of the Greeks it would be pressed in the House of Representatives.

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26. Howe, Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution, p. 358.

What would be Mr. Clay's course in the case I could not foresee---- as he had some prospect of the succession himself, I should not suppose he would wish it encumbered with a quarrel with all Europe. But, be that as it may, it was infinitely better that the impulse should come from Congress than that it should go from the Executive.Congress are responsible for their own acts. Foreign powers are apt to take less notice of them than of Executive measures, and if they put us in attitudes of hostility with the allies, be the blame upon them. The ground I wish to take is that of earnest remonstrance against the interference of the European powers by force with South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe; to make an American cause, and adhere inflexibly to that."[27.]

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27. Adams, Memoirs, VI, p. 197.

Chapter III

PHILHELLENISM, 1823 - 24

Whether the American people, like the President himself, did not understand the whole significance of the doctrine of the "American Cause" as promulgated in the latter's message to Congress, or whether, understanding, they were yet unafraid of provoking the wrath of Turkey or the Holy Allies, one hesitates to assert. Perhaps they neither understood the one nor feared the other. Certain it is that the activities of the winter and spring following the President's message reached a highwater mark of enthusiasm.

As the President had said in his message, the people were stirred to an unprecedented degree of sympathetic fervour for the Greek patriots and their destitute families. Several causes contributed to this sentiment. When it was seen by the fall of 1823 that the insurgents seemed likely to hold their own and this uprising not fail as so many previous attempts had, America joined with the European people in their applause. The contest was hailed as a war of religion, Christianity against Mohammedanism, "the Cross against the Crescent."[1] It seems that the heroism and perseverance of the handful of ill-trained, ill-fed soldiers fighting against odds, and the daring deeds of the leaders, appealed to the hero-worship inherent in every human being. The literature of the period shows that their names became household words, and their deeds and their distresses were topics of conversation and corres-

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1. North Am. Review, XVII, p. 420

pondence.[2] Marco Bozzaris and his Suliote band were immortalized to American school children by the stirring poem from the pen of the youthful Fitz-Halleck; Ipsilanti, Mavrocordatos, Kanaris of the "fire-ships", each received his share of praise and adulation. But probably more than any of these causes, the attitude of the Greeks themselves towards our governments and people endeared them to the American heart. They looked upon us as being, more than any other people, like themselves; for they knew our history and in general had the idea that the colonies had suffered from Great Britain the same kind of direct and personal oppression that they themselves suffered from the Turks; they knew that the colonies had by desperate struggle thrown off the yoke of dominion and were now enjoying what they themselves were fighting for.[3] The government of the United States was the model after which their crude attempts at self-government were patterned.[4]

Added to this band of brotherhood felt alike by Greeks and Americans there was ever the deep antipathy long felt by the people of the United States towards the Holy Alliance and its menacing hostility towards liberalism and republican institutions. It was generally felt that this was an opportune time for America to live up to her avowed slogan of democracy and brotherhood of mankind, to exhibit her dislike and even contempt for the pretentious

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2. Tuckerman, "The United States and the Greek Revolution", Mag. of Am. Hist., XVIII, p. 220.

3. Howe, Hist. Sketch of Gr. Revolution, p. 357.

4. See Chapter II, note 9 of this essay.

Holy Alliance.[5] Russia, for her non-intervention, was looked upon as a traitor to Christianity and so indirectly an enemy to the Greek cause and all who might sympathize with it.[6]

The tide of philhellenism, as the sympathy and enthusiasm for Greece was called, thrilled the citizens of the United States as they had not been thrilled for years. In the leading cities committees were formed to raise money and supplies for the families despoiled by the Turks; ministers exhorted the charity of their congregations, orators found the subject a theme for impassioned appeal, through the columns of periodicals the reading public was informed on every aspect of the affair, the while extolling the righteousness of the cause.[7]

Many and unique were the methods of raising money and arousing enthusiasm. Numerous instances of personal labor and sacrifice are recorded . Atlases, maps, and historical sketches were quickly produced and commanded a wide sale, the proceeds being given to the Committees.[8] One particularly interesting case well illustrates the personal efforts, and, incidentally, throws an interesting side-light on John Quincy Adams' consistency in principle and action. Dr. Thornton of Washington began preparing a book containing the names and subscriptions of all persons in service at the capital who contributed to the Greek fund, each

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5. Adams, Memoirs, VI, p. 170.

6. Niles', Register, XXV, p. 281.

7. Port Folio, XIII-XVI, passim; Niles' Register, XXV-XXVI, passim; N. Am. Review, XVII-XX, passim.

8. Ibid.

individual to subscribe one day's salary. The book was then to be deposited in the Congressional library. He called on the President, who promised to consult his cabinet on the advisability of subscribing. Dr Thornton then interviewed Secretary Adams, "The Secretaries of War and Navy said they would subscribe if I would," Adams wrote in his diary, May 10, 1824. "Lord Eldon, the English Chancellor had subscribed a hundred pounds sterling ----- I told him (Thornton) I should not subscribe for the Greeks, nor advise the President to subscribe. We had objects of distress to relieve at home more than sufficient to absorb all my capacities of contribution; and a subscription for the Greeks would, in my view of things, be a breach of neutrality, and therefore improper."[9] The elder Adams was entirely in sympathy with the cause and contributed "his mite in the general subscription of the State of Massachusetts."[10] Of the beginnings of this movement Hezekiah Niles gives an interesting account in his Weekly Register: "The people of New York are fully in earnest to do something handsome for the assistance of the Greeks. At a late meeting of the committee of the Greek fund, William Bayard, chairman, and Charles King, secretary, a letter was presented from Nicholas Biddle of Philadelphia, containing $300 for the good of the cause ------- it is recommended that collections be made in the churches, and expected that it will become quite fashionable to assist those who are descendents of the bulwark of light and knowledge in old times, rescuing them from the

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9. Adams, Memoirs, VI, p. 324.
10. Niles' Register, XXV, p. 324.

dominion of a barbaric race ---------- if the Greeks should fail we shall have the consolation to know that we were not indifferent spectators to the scene".[11]

New York led the way in organized work in September, 1823, when the ladies of the city prepared a twenty-foot cross inscribed "sacred to the cause of the Greeks", and had it planted on Brooklyn Heights with proper ceremonies, "In the presence of a large and brilliant assembly".[12] Thus the campaign was launched. To assist became "quite fashionable".

In November a subscription office was opened at Insurance Office No. 52, Wall Street, and donations "in cash or otherwise", were received and forwarded "by a most respectable committee".[13] A month later Henry Wheaton wrote to the editor of the North American Review, whose editorial columns had shown special zeal;"Keep up the Greek Fire! We are all in a blaze here".[14] Balls and bazaars then as now became popular forms of remunerative amusement, and it would seem that politics and pity hobnobbed together when we read in the Weekly Register of January 13, 1824, of the New York corporation having loaned a portrait of General Jackson to be placed in the dancing room of a ball given January 8, the profits from which should be turned into the Greek fund, "and the New York paper calls the proceedings "Greek Fire! '", (a term as greatly

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11. Niles' Register, XXV, p. 324.

12. Ibid., XXV, pp. 227-8.

13. Ibid, XXV, p. 328.

14. Adams, Life and Writings of Jared Sparks, I, p. 340.

overworked then as equally popular expressions have been at later times). The funds from New York City were sent through the firm of Baring and Company, London, to Richard Rush, and minister to the Court of St. James, who remitted them to the Greek agents there. One consignment amounted to 6,600 £.[15]

Philadelphia was not far behind in generous expression. On 11th December a general meeting of citizens was held in the Masonic hall, to consider proper measures of expressing sympathy. The assembly was not unmindful of the possible disagreeable effect upon Turkey and the Holy Allies which widespread demonstrations here might have, as indicating a state of mind tending towards war. The speakers of the occasion discussed the matter at some length, but in general concluded there need be no fears of reprisal.[16]

Boston, Pittsburgh, Albany, Princeton, and other centres had their local committees, sending money and even whole cargoes of provisions and clothing to be distributed among the suffering families of the Greek patriots.[17]

Not content with donations of comfort and cheer, the New Yorkers and Bostonians assumed a more belligerent attitude, and we read that in the summer of 1824 from the former city, "$31,932,29, besides a quantity of munitions of war, has been sent to the Greeks,[18] and, "In the ship 'Triton', sailing from Boston November

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15. Niles' Register, XXV, p. 394; Portfolio, XVIII, p. 250.

16. Niles' Register, XXV, pp. 245-6.

17. Ibid., There is a summarized account of the total amount of money sent by America, but we read of the Philadelphia fund amounting to 16,670 dollars at one time, Boston, 1300 ff.

18. Portfolio, XVII, p. 147.

7, (1824), several gentlemen sailed for Greece with recommendations to that Government intending to offer their services".[19]

In 1818 such had been the enthusiasm for the South American cause that Congress enacted a more stringent law forbidding participation by our citizens in the war for independence, or the sending of munitions of war. But no such restraint was imposed upon the ardent spirits who from America, as from every other Christian country, were joining the Hellenic army. During the early years of the struggle, especially, the term Philhellene was a word to conjure with. As Laura Richards so ably expresses it: "It meant a man, generally a young man, who was eager and ready to give up ease, custom, and money-getting and go over the sea to fight a savage foe among the savage mountains, by the side of an oft-times no less savage ally", all for love of liberty and adventure.[20] Such was the ideal young Philhellene, but in truth it must be said that many fell far short of the ideal, more nearly approaching the Don Quixote type in temperament and ideas, not to mention the ignoble spirits an odin-glory or self-emolument bent.

Of this class the well known philanthropist, Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe, gives a very interesting graphic description in his journal: "Philhellenes in general. What a queer set! What an assem-

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19. Niles' Register, XXVII, p. 192.

20. Richards, Journals and Letters of Samuel Grindley Howe, p. 21.

blage of romantic, adventurous, restless, crack-brained young men from the far corners of the world! How much courage and talent is to be found among them ; ----------Quixotism and egotism undoubtedly abound in a mass of queer material, but egotism swallows up all the others, and the Philhellene becomes --------puffed up by vanity while his coat is out at the elbows; cursing the Greek as depraved while he himself is carrying an open and shameless debauchery, and crying out against their trickery and baseness, while he himself ------- is trying to gorge the fat of the land and fill a purse which he brought empty from home".[21]

The example set by the poet Byron, his romantic venture and tragic death, his idealization of the Greek cause, was a spur to the more idealistic spirits.

Among these was Dr. Howe,[22] then an aspiring young Boston physician who left his home in 1824 and gave his services to the Greeks throughout the Revolution, sometimes as a common soldier in the ranks, and again as surgeon -in-chief to the fleet. He it was who saw to it that the relief cargoes were wisely and fairly distributed and the cash donations well spent. Among other worthy Americans who enlisted, and whose names most frequently occur in the literature of the day, were Captain Miller of Vermont, a Dr. Russ, and a certain Lieutenant Jarvis. Others there were of less repute, and some who became notorious, whose services were more

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21. Richards, Journals and Letters of Samuel Grindley Howe, p. 333.

22. Ibid., p. 126.

detrimental than helpful.[23]

While this charitable and enthusiastic spirit was animating the country at large and a few chivalrous young men in particular, there were many individuals who realized the truth of the Greek agents' argument,[24] and knew that some expression of recognition and out-spoken encouragement would strengthen the morale of the revolutionists as nothing else would. These were already pressing their cause on the organ of the democracy, Congress.

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23. Richards, Journals and Letters of Samuel Grindley Howe, p. 231.f

24. See chapter II of this essay, note 7.

Chapter IV

CONGRESS AND THE GREEK CAUSE, 1823 -24.

The interest and sympathies of a free democratic people are not likely to be confined to mere works of charity or to formal expressions of sympathy when political action may be more effective. From her own not far distant experience America realized the inestimable moral support that could be conferred upon a weak and struggling nation by recognition from another and well-established government. If at first the appeal from the Greeks was unheeded it was only because the government they had set up was on foundations still too shaky to merit attention.[1] By the early autumn of 1823 that precarious period was past, in the opinion of many. It was felt that the case had become analogous to that of the South American republics when diplomatic relations were begun with them. Adams' theory of the "American Cause", with the New World and the Old in separate and "water-tight compartments," was at least not shared by all, if indeed comprehended. As it was known that the United States was bound by no treaty relations with the Turkish Government, many felt we should do no less by Greece than by South America.[2]

During the early months of the winter of 1823-24 Congress was beleaguered by petitions to that effect. On December

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1. Port Folio, XVII, Webster, Writings and Speeches, V, p. 60.
2. North Am. Rev. XVII, p. 413.

29 Morgan of New York presented to the House a memorial from the citizens of New York City,[3] which, after dwelling upon the virtues of the Greek cause, and suggesting its analogy to that of the Spanish colonies, expressed the anxious desire of the citizens of New York, either that "the independence of the Greeks may be speedily and formally recognized, or such steps preparatory thereto taken, as may, in the opinion of the Government, be consistent with its interests, its policy and its honor."[4] On January 2 a resolution from the South Carolina legislature, affirming that that state would "hail with delight the recognition by the American Government of the independence of Greece",[5] was communicated to the Senate. Three days later the House received a document, this time a powerfully worded memorial from Boston,[6] which went to greater length than had any of the others. In essence it decried the Turkish despotism on the coasts and inlands of the Mediterranean, bewailed the horrors of the Scio massacres, took on a practical hue by suggesting that "the erection of a new and free state in the Mediterranean, possessing the southern coasts of Greece and the Island of Candia and Cyprus, would be a powerful check on the barbarous dependencies of the Porte in those seas and give facility

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3. Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., I Sess., I p.889.

4. Ibid., II, pp. 3105 - 07.

5. Ibid., I,p. 80.

6. Ibid., I, p. 931.

to that commercial enterprise which now finds its way only to the one port of Asiatic and European Turkey," and said that while "your memorialists would not presume to make any suggestions as to the course which it may become the American Government to pursue, at this interesting crisis ---- they feel ------- that just weight and obligation of that policy which hitherto prohibited an interference with the internal concerns of any of the Powers of Europe; and content themselves, therefore, with expressing their assurance, that, if the peculiar and unprecendented condition of the Greeks, should, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, form a case of exception to that rule of policy, the measures which may be adopted shall receive their cordial support."[7]

Not even this document provoked discussion.With all the others of similar nature received from time to time, it was tabled.

But meanwhile a significant movement was taking form with the House itself. Early in November, Daniel Webster, about to return to Congress, after six years absence, as representative from the Suffolk district in Massachusetts, wrote to his friend Edward Everett, then editor of the North American Review;"If nobody does it who can do it better I shall certainly say something of the Greeks -----I begin to think they have character enough to carry them through the contest with success."[8]

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7. Annals of Congress 18 Cong. 1 Sess. Vo. II, pp. 3107-09

8. Webster, Writings and Speeches, XVII, 326.

This inclination was strengthened by favorable news of the revolution a few days later, and he determined to try to bring about the appointment of a commissioner to Greece.[9] Webster was a constant reader of Everett's articles on Greece that appeared in the North American Review at this time.[10] A paragraph of the essay entitled, "Affairs of Greece", that appeared in the October number of the magazine, suggests the inspiration for Webster's plan: "As to our country, we think, the course our government should adopt, sufficiently indicated by its own conduct towards South America. If more accurate information of the state of Greece is wanted, let the president do as he did in 1817, when he dispatched a public vessel with a respectable commission to enquire into the progress of the revolution in that country. We have always a fleet in the Mediterranean; let a similar commission be directed to repair to it, and on board of one of its vessels visit the principal ports of Greece, ascertain the progress of the war, and the degree of organization of the government. Should they report, as they must, for they are well known facts, the circumstances which we have enumerated, then let the independence of Greece be acknowledged by the United States, and a minister sent to their government.----- We have no treaties with the Turk to impose restraint upon us ----

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9. Webster, Writings and Speeches, XVII, 322-39.

10. Ibid., XVII, p. 326, ff.

America has already been called on by the Greeks to adopt such a course ---------"[11]

The fact that in his message to Congress on December 2 the President took " pretty high ground as to this continent" and so would be "afraid of the appearance of interfering in the concern of the other continent also" did not weigh greatly with Webster, who thought we had "as much community with Greeks as with the inhabitants of the Andes, and the dwellers on the borders of the Vermilion seas."[12] He consulted several prominent men on the subject and found them warmly approving of his plan.[13] So, notwithstanding the fact that the Administration was already formally committed against any action that might smack of "entangling alliance" with, or interference in, Europe, on December 8 Webster submitted to the House a resolution that "provision ought to be made, by law, for defraying the expense incident to the appointment of an agent, or commissioner, to Greece, whenever the President

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11. N. Am. Review, XVII, p. 413.

12. Webster, Writings and Speeches, XVII, pp. 332-333.

13. One writer, Curtis, in his Life of Daniel Webster, I, p. 201, says that Webster consulted President Monroe, but there seems to be no evidence on this point other than his expressed intention of doing so: "I have spoken to several gentlemen on the subject of a motion respecting Greece, and all of them approve it ----------I intend to see in the course of this day and tomorrow. Mr. R. King, Mr. Clay, and perhaps the President learn their views of this matter," -- Letter to Everett, Dec. 5, 1823. On the following day he wrote to Everett again, but made no mention of such an interview. Webster, Writings and Speeches, p. 332.

shall deem it expeditious to make such appointment."[14]

The resolution lay on the table six weeks, during which time its author was busy preparing his introductory speech, at the cost of much pains and labor; while the House was equally busy making preparation for its consideration. Many of the members, aware of the complexity and uncertain conditions of the diplomatic situation at that time, had been impressed and made deeply apprehensive by the serious, not to say sombre tone of the President's message. The more timid were ready to picture an invasion of this continent by the allied powers as soon as they had finished with Spain, for it was rumored that the monarchs were determined to aid Spain in the recovery of her colonies.[15] Under such circumstances it behooved the United States to act carefully". Much of the prevalent uneasiness and the significance attached to trivial matters was due to the uncertain and fragmentary knowledge of the true status of our foreign relations. No concise information could be gained from President Monroe concerning the affairs of Spain or of South America,[16] and the only satisfaction to be gained concerning our Greek relations was that afforded by the very meagre material submitted by Secretary Adams, at the request of the House.[17] This consisted of his correspondence with Rush and Luriottis, and the statement concerning Greek affairs made at the beginning of the year.[18] Others there were who intended to argue the matter from

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14. Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., Sess., I, p. 801.

15. Ibid., I, p. 919.
16. Ibid., I, pp. 868, 896.
17. Ibid., I, pp. 843, 847, II, p. 2916.
18. See previous chapter.

a business standpoint, and these caused the Secretary of the Treasury to transmit a statement of commerce of the United States with the forts and countries under control of the Sultan and with those in possession of the revolting Greeks.[19]

When, on January 19, the House resolved itself into Committee of the Whole, and Webster rose to launch the debate on his resolution, he faced a crowded and expectant House, eager to hear such an orator speak on the subject then dear to the public heart.[20] Besides, it was his first deliberate speech in Congress in six years, and the opening speech of his second entrance into that body.

Those who expected a marvellous flow of sentiment were doomed to disappointment. A careful observer of the political policy that had been definitely shaping itself in Europe since 1814, Webster considered this a fitting occasion to take advantage of the Greek Revolution and the attitude manifested towards it by the powers, to show the menace of their principles, to free all nations. After devoting a very short time to speaking of the sentiment attached to the Greek cause, he proceeded vividly to arraign the Holy Alliance and then searchingly criticized its treaty arrangements, its congresses, and its circulars, those of Troppau and Laybach in particular. He pointed out the danger to the independence of nations and the institutions of free governments that lay in the reactionary principles governing the conduct of the Holy Alliance, arguing that while the United States was entirely right in pursuing her ancient policy of non-intervention, yet it

19. Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., i Sess., I, pp. 849,870, 917,1063
20. Ogg, Daniel Webster, p. 141.

behooved her, in the broader interests of humanity, not to intervene by force of arms, but to throw the weight of her influence openly against the designs of the continental powers. He declared that "As one of the free States among the nations, as a great and rapidly rising Republic, it would be impossible for us, if we were so disposed, to prevent our principles, our sentiments, and our example from producing some effect upon the opinions and hopes of society throughout the civilized world. The great political question of the age is that between absolute and regulated governments -------our place is on the side of free institutions."

Rapidly reviewing the progress of the revolution, and the reasonableness of believing that the Greeks had established and would most likely maintain a de facto government, he appealed to Congress to pass the resolution and so provide the President with the means of entering into commercial relations with the Greek nation whenever he should deem it discreet to do so. There could be no danger of retaliation on the part of Turkey, he maintained, for the action proposed could hardly be more offensive than measures already taken by the nation in sending money and supplies, or the statement of sympathy and hope of ultimate success contained in the President's message, to which this proposal would be but a congressional endorsement. And finally, he urged that this expression of sympathy and interest be not delayed but given at a time when it would do some good.[21]

The responses to Webster's speech showed sharply

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21. Annals of Congress, 18. Cong., i Sess., I, pp. 1084-1099; Webster, Writings and Speeches, V, pp 61-93

divergent opinions, yet withal were much what he had expected.[22] Some thought the resolution little better than a declaration of war, some feared it would lead to war;[23] others saw in it substantial aid to the Greeks and unjustifiable interference in the affairs of Turkey; still others, impressed by the ominous tones of the President's message, felt so sure that the Holy Allies would soon attack the South American republics and we would be called upon to defend the high ground taken by the President in regard to this continent, that they shrank from the thought of our mingling in the broils of Europe, weak as an infant for overseas fighting as we were, when soon we might have to struggle for preservation of our liberties. To some the most cogent argument

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22. In December Webster had written to Everett: " I believe there will be a good deal of discussion, although, if any, pretty much on one side. While some of our Boston friends, as I know, think this resolution a little quixotic, leading to a crusade, it will be objected to strongly by many on account of its tame milk and water character. The merchants are naturally enough a little afraid about their cargoes at Smyrna; besides, Greece is a long way off." Writings and Speeches, XVII 335-6. For full account of the debate see Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., I Sess., I pp. 1084-1204 passim.

23. "Some have treated the resolution as an abstract declaration of war, and others have assumed that it would certainly lead to war; and thus mounted on a monster of their own creation, they have gone off at full speed, spreading devastation and terror in their path" ----- Letter from Joseph Hopkinson to Webster, Feb., 1, 1824, Writings and Speeches, XVII, p. 344.

was that our thriving commerce with Turkey and her dependencies would be jeopardized should the Sultan choose to take offense at our attitude.

In vain the earnest supporters of the resolution answered the arguments of the opposition, stoutly maintaining that there need be no such calamities resulting from it as the timorous seemed to fear; that if certain powers chose to take offense on such slight provocation, it was high time that they be disillusioned of the idea that they could inflict their principles on all nations. To satisfy the thrifty-minded it was shown that the United States stood to gain more by commerce with Greece than she could ever lose in case the trade with the thriftless Turk be cut off. It could at most, said Dwight and Baylies of Massachusetts, Cook of Illinois, and others, it could at most be interpreted only as a proof of America's hearty sympathy. Henry Clay, Speaker of the House, was the warmest advocate of all. He knew, as did the others, that the whole nation would be behind the congressional action proposed. He pointed the finger of scorn at those who opposed the resolution on personal or party grounds, meaning John Randolph in particular, who had poured forth the vials of his sarcasm on what he called a piece of Quixotism.

"I know", said Clay, "That at least some of the objections to the original proposal are occasioned by the source from which it has proceeded ------ if a gentleman who happens to belong to a different party, in political sentiment, shall bring forward a proposition fraught with liberal principles and noble sentiments, is it to be rejected for his sake? ------- If

this be the case we cease to be Republicans." As to the danger of offending the European confederation, he ridiculed the idea that the United States should wait and follow in its wake. She should not hesitate to follow her own inclinations, even supposing this revolution to be tacit recognition of the independence of Greece; "Will the gentlemen attempt to maintain that on the principles of the law of nations, those allies would have cause of war? If there be any principle which has been settled for ages, any which is founded on the very nature of things, it is that every independent state has the clear right to judge of the fact of existence of other powers." Clay's speech ended in a splendid burst of impassioned appeal, challenging the members of the House to "go home, if you can, go home, if you dare, to your constituents and tell them that ---------a proposition was made in the Congress of the United States, almost the sole, the last, the greatest depository of human hope and freedom, the representatives of a gallant nation, containing a million of freemen ready to fly to arms, while the people of that nation were spontaneously expressing its deep-toned feeling, and the whole continent, by one simultaneous emotion, was rising and silently and anxiously supplicating high Heaven to spare and succor Greece -------a proposition was made to send a messenger to Greece, to inquire into her state and condition, with a kind expression of our good wishes and our sympathies ----- and you voted it down! "[24]

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24. Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., 1 Sess., I, pp. 1170-1177. Clay, Works, I.

His ringing appeal immortalized him in the world of oratory and entrenched him still more firmly in the hearts of his friends, but its practical effect was nil. After nearly a week of debating the House rose without asking leave to sit again and the resolution was lost without even coming to a vote.

As to why it failed in spite of the advocacy of such able leaders one can only conjecture. A few days later, Webster wrote to a personal friend, ex-Senator Jeremiah Mason of New England: "The motion ought to have been adopted, and would have been by general vote but for certain reasons, which the public will never know, and which I will not trouble you with now. I could divide the House very evenly now, and perhaps carry a vote. Whether I shall stir it again must be considered. Mr. Adams' opposition to it was the most formidable obstacle."[25]

Webster's speech, pronounced by Mason the "best piece of parliamentary eloquence and statesmanlike reasoning our country can show,"[26] at least accomplished his deeper purpose, giving to the public, not the pleasing display of oratory to which the subject so well lent itself, but a forceful expose of the machinations of the Holy Alliance and its menace to republican institutions. In London, where it met with general approbation and applause, a Greek translation was made and printed in order to be distributed

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25. McMaster, Daniel Webster, p. 107.

26. Webster, Writings and Speeches, I, p. 68, Everett, Oration and Speeches, IV, p. 203.

all over Greece.[27] The author himself long considered it his best speech saying that he was "more fond of this child than of any of the family",[28] referring to his published speeches.

Although no legislative or executive action followed the discussion in Congress later developments show that the effort was not without good results. Ours seems to have been the first Government even to consider means of encouraging the revolutionists. Charles Tuckerman, minister to Greece many years later, says that they were so appreciative of our evinced sympathy that, a year later, the Provisional Government actually proposed sending a fleet into the Mediterranean with one of our public men, Felton, who should assume the office of legislator, or dictator, on the summons of the Greek nation. This proposal was made, as they said, because they "suspected the motives of the English and shuddered at the despotic aims of the Holy Alliance, whose members had hoped that the insurrection would be suppressed by Ibrahim Pacha and his Egyptian hordes."[29]

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27. See letter from H. A. S. Dearborn to Webster, May 4, 1824, in which he tells of receiving a letter from a London friend,- Van Tyne, The Letters of Daniel Webster, p. 104. Curtis in his Life of Daniel Webster, I, p. 204, and Everett in a speech delivered many years later, Orations and Speeches, IV, p. 203 say the speech was translated into most of the European languages and circulated not only on the Continent but throughout Latin — America as well, but this "undoubtedly an oratorical exaggeration.

28. See above reference to letter from H.A.S. Dearborn.

29. Tuckerman, "The United States and the Greek Revolution", Magazine of American History, XVIII, p. 226.

Chapter V

CONTINUED INTEREST, 1824 - 28.

With the passing of the summer of 1824 the excitement over the Greek question subsided into quiet interest. The committees continued to send occasional cargoes of provisions, but the presidental election became the absorbing topic of the day. That year marked the end of the heyday of Greek success. The provisional government's credit was so well established that large loans were floated by its friends. The government itself was less disturbed by quarrelsome factions than had been the case for some time. But the tide was beginning to turn. Too many speculators abroad were anxious to pull a plum out of what the English author Hobhouse facetiously termed "that financial pastry, the Greek pie." Then, in the spring of 1825, the Sultan turned to his Egyptian dependency for aid, and Ibrahim Pacha crossed the sea and entered the Grecian peninsula, with his fresh, disciplined troops, seemingly sweeping every thing before him. The European Powers, England in particular, were busily conferring as to the advisability and means of bringing about peace between the belligerents, but no agreement acceptable to all parties concerned could be reached. While holding Russia from entering the war on the one hand, Canning was attempting to bring Turkey to terms on the other. He was not insensible to what had been taking place in the United States, and now he tried to bring the influence of her name and sentiment to bear on the Sultan, "It is to be considered," he wrote, September, 1825, in his instructions to Stratford Canning,

the British envoy to the Porte, "that the recent events in the new hemisphere have practically approximated, as it were, the different divisions of the world to each other and have brought to bear on every question of political struggle or change in whatever part of the globe it may arise. The Porte cannot doubt that all the inhabitants of both Americas, to a man, are in their hearts favourers of the Greek cause, and might at no distant period become active cooperators, in it. This is not the language of intimidation; it is that of truth."[1] Thus the indefatigable British Foreign Secretary who had, according to his own assertion, "called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the old ", was already attempting to introduce the influence of that New World into the affairs of the Old.

Other statesmen of Europe watched America's developments with deepest interest. Lafayette, who had been visiting in this country until late in the summer of 1825, held as one of the dearest wishes of his heart the hope that the United States, "the apple of his eye", would lead the world in bringing the trouble in Greece to a speedy and satisfactory close. He seemed to feel that the very presence of United States ships in the troubled waters of the Mediterranean would be no inconsequential factor in this.[2]

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1. Wellington's Despatches, II, p. 535.

2. Clay, Works, IV, passim; Webster, Writings and Speeches, XVII, passim; Richards, Letters and Journal of S. G. Howe, passim.

On September 6, 1825, an agent to Greece, in the person of William C. Somerville, was quietly commissioned by President Adams, Clay, as Secretary of State, wrote his instructions, which were, simply to facilitate commercial relations between the two countries. While on his way to Greece,[3] Somerville became ill and was forced to stay in Paris several months.[4]

In the first draft of his message to Congress in December, 1825, President Adams, almost the last man whom we should expect to do such a thing, inserted a strong paragraph on the insurrection, but which he expunged on the advice of his cabinet, and because he himself had of it " the strongest doubts." The finished document confined itself to a mere academic expression of sympathy.[5]

Had Canning withheld his "intimidation note" until the summer of 1826 it might have carried greater weight, for in May of that year an event occurred which, had it been more generally known, might have caused serious complications for the United States. In 1824 the Greek officials ordered their deputies in London, Luriottis and Orlandos, to procure as speedily as possible eight small frigates, of thirty guns each. Because of the difficulty of sending an armament to Greece from any European port the deputies determined to call in the services of ship-building concerns

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3. Dams, Memoirs, VII, p. 48; Moore, Digest of International Law, I, pp. 214.15.

4. Clay, Works, IV, pp. 133, 135, 138; Adams, Memoirs, VII, p. 48; It seems doubtful that Somerville lived to reach his destination. See Adams, Memoirs , VII, p. 48 n.

5. Adams, Memoirs VII, p. 61.

in the United States. Accordingly they consulted the head of the Philhellenic committee of New York, William Bayard, as to the legality and feasibility of having the vessels constructed in New York yards. Bayard, who was also junior member of the LeRay, Bayard and Company ship-building house, gave every assurance of the entire practicability of the plan. This firm and another, the G.G.and S.Howland Company, engaged each to build a frigate for approximately 250,000 dollars, the work to be completed in six months. The purchase was to be made with money from the English loan floated through the efforts of the Greek Committee in London. The bargain struck,a French army officer of philhellenic sympathies but of no ability for the task before him was sent to New York to superintend the proceedings. Several more than the allotted six months passed. From time to time the firms drew on the Greek funds for immense sums, and still the vessels were unfinished. Becoming alarmed and suspicious,the deputies despatched one of their countrymen,Contostavlos, to investigate. The frigates were nearly completed by that time. The firms, pressed to give account of the expenditures, showed that 750,000 dollars had already been spent, and declared that enough more would be needed that the whole cost would total 1, 200,000 dollars. The agent was dismayed, but, deciding to sacrifice the one ship to save the other, hastened to Washington, where, through the active and vigorous assistance of a few members of Congress, a bill was passed, May 17, 1825, authorizing the President to purchase a frigate ready built. This bill was smuggled through under the title "An act supplementary to 'An act for the gradual increase of the navy of the United States'".

It authorized the President to "cause the building of one ships authorized by the act for the gradual increasement of the navy of the United States, to be suspended, and the timber for the same to be laid up and secured . And he is hereby authorized, if in his opinion the same can be done on advantageous terms to the United States, to purchase a ship of not less than the smallest class authorized by the said act.-------"[6] The purchase was made for about 230,000 dollars, its value as estimated by an American naval officer, Commodore Bainbridge.[7]

While this was taking place the agent and the firms had put the disputed points of the matter into the hands of a board of three arbitrators, who not only upheld the claims of the firms, but awarded them even more than had been asked. In addition the arbitrators charged for their own services the modest sum of 1500 dollars each, to be paid from the Greek fund. So, because of merciless graft on the part of the alleged friends, the Greeks were forced to be content with one frigate, the "Hope", afterwards christened the "Hellas", a splendid vessel and a boon to the Greek navy, to be sure, but scarcely worth the net sum of 750,000 dollars that it finally cost them, not to mention the

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6. U. S. Statutes at Large, IV, p. 168-9; House Journal, 19 Cong., 1 Sess. pp. 550,561, 580, 600.

7. Howe, Historical Sketch, pp. 363, 366; Niles Register, XXXIII, 134; Adams, Memoirs, VII, p. 124.

unfortunate eleven months' delay.

Congress' action in the matter was not made public for some time. When it finally became known the citizens of Philadelphia made some attempts to raise funds sufficient to purchase the frigate bought by the Government, the "Liberator", but their plans seem never to have materialized.[9] The governmental transaction met with general approbation and public sentiment was somewhat appeased for its disappointment of two years before.

The ship-building affair was bruited about Europe, where the prestige of American philhellenism was considerably lessened. Yet Greek committees and individuals of the European cities were in many instances doing such ruthless profiteering that, as the Times expressed it, "We have exhausted our indignation ---- on London concerns and---- have little left to bestow on the American contractors."[10]

As for the Greek people themselves, the ultimate victims of the transaction, while the better informed were grieved and astonished at this piece of flagrant dishonesty, the populace in general either did not hear the details, or, hearing, would not believe, preferring to add the guilt of the whole business to the already long list of abuses laid at the door of their agents in London.[11]

On January 2, 1827, Representative Edward Livingston, of Louisiana, long an ardent enthusiast of the Greek cause, intro-

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9. Niles' Register, XXXIII, p. 181.

10. Ibid., pp. 211-259.

11. Howe, Historical Sketch, pp. 358-359.

duced a resolution to the effect that Congress should make an appropriation of fifty thousand dollars to be expended, under the direction of the President, in the purchase and transport of provisions for the suffering inhabitants of Greece. His argument was based on the assumption that such an act could not be unconstitutional, since the government had done the very same thing in the case of refugees from San Domingo, and earthquake victims in Venezuela, when those countries were at war with Spain. But the House refused to consider the resolution, by a vote of a hundred and nine to fifty-four.[12]

In May of that year President Sissiny of the National Assembly of Greece wrote President Adams a warm letter of thanks to the American people for their continued kindness, saying that "In extending a helping hand toward the Old World and encouraging it in its march toward freedom and civilization, the New World covers itself with increased glory and does honor to humanity."[13]

At the opening of the year 1827 the prospects of the Greeks were very dark and unpromising. The islands were free and prospering, but the greater part of the provinces were scenes of utter devastation, and the sufferings of the destitute people were becoming greater than at any previous time. The Greek philanthropists of the continent were relieving the distresses of the soldiery, but the condition of the non-combatant population became

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12. Congressional Debates, 19 Cong., 2 Sess., II, pp.577-80.

13. Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., VI, pp. 627, 636, 637.

desperate. Finally, at the urgent request of the Greek Government, Dr. Howe returned to America to arouse new enthusiasm.[14] Although at first repulsed by the proverbial Boston chilliness, he persisted in his efforts, and at Everett's suggestion he made a lecture tour of the leading cities. The piracies in the Mediterranean had prejudiced the minds of many people, but Dr. Howe soon found that philhellenism in general was "not dead but sleeping".[15] America once more rose generously to the occasion and cargo after cargo of clothing and provisions was despatched to Paros. Howe's personality and enthusiasm loosed the purse strings of the well-to-do, and when he returned to Greece in 1828 he carried with him funds sufficient to build and equip a modern hospital, an institution so sorely needed, yet hitherto unknown to the sadly neglected sick and wounded.

So we must close the account of the interest taken by the philhellenistic community of the United States, their personal activities, and the attitude manifested by the executive and the legislature in the face of it.

However, since a discussion of a nation's foreign activities and intersts can scarcely be complete unless it takes into account the manoeveurs of its navy, its so-called "floating territory", we must turn to the story of the United States squadron in the Mediterranean. To do this it is necessary to go back to the year 1824, the date with which the present chapter opened.

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14. Richards, Letters and Journals of S. G. Howe, p. 268 ff.

15. Ibid., p. 278.

Chapter VI

THE SQUADRON IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1824-25.

Early in 1824 the government decided to improve the squadron then stationed in the Mediterranean by adding to it a line of battleship and a frigate, and by placing it in command of the senior officer of the navy, Commodore John Rodgers. Thus it was that the fleet which assembled at Gibraltar in the midsummer of 1825 to start on the customary round of quasi-patrol was the largest, most up-to-date and best equipped force that the United States had yet sent into those waters. Heretofore the small squadron of three or four light vessels maintained there afforded ample protection against occasional piracies and proved sufficient check on the Barbary Powers. Indeed no positive exertion had been found necessary for several years.

But "new occasions make new duties", and this unusual display of force appeared none too soon. After the outbreak of the Greek revolution many lawless sailors took advantage of the unsettled conditions and vigorously plied the pirate's trade. Inhabitants of the island of the Archipelago and of the mainland were reduced to such desperate straits by the war that this illicit means of livelihood seemed the only means of existence, while foreign craft often hoisted the Greek flag and aided in making the eastern Mediterranean and the straits of the Archipelago unsafe for the passage of trading vessels without strong convoy.
To make matters worse, on the 8th of June, 1824, the Greek govern-

ment, driven to desperation by English, French, and Austrian[1] merchantmen aiding the Sultan by transporting arms, munitions, and even soldiers to Turkish fortresses from ports in other Turkish provinces, Egypt in particular, authorized their cruisers to attack and destroy all European vessels found carrying such cargo. Although this order was later rescinded ~~yet~~ it gave such impetus to lawless depredations that no merchant vessel of however innocent character could safely approach Smyrna or the northern ports without convoy. At the same time a war between Algiers and Great Britain was disturbing the peace of the Mediterranean.

In addition to his regular duties as Commandant Rodgers had a special duty to perform, an errand of a diplomatic nature. Our trade with Smyrna[2] and other Turkish ports had steadily increased since the close of the War of 1812. By 1820 the American vessels to Smyrna annually numbered at least thirteen, each with a cargo worth upwards of a million dollars. On one occasion twenty such merchant ships were said to have been seen lying in the harbor. Although treaty relations were early established between the United States and Turis, Algiers, and Tripoli, little had been done to protect and facilitate the Levant trade or the property and lives of American merchants or other citizens. Protection had been given in a haphazard fashion at times by the English Levant Company, and again through the good offices of the

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1. Dr Howe, at that time in the Greek service, says he knew of but one American vessel engaging in such trade. It was from Boston. Howe, Historical Sketch, pp. 203-204, n.

2. The history of our early trade with Turkey is told by Paullin in his "Treaty Negotiations", Chapter 6.

Sultan's representatives themselves, and, in a few instances, by Greek sailors.

In 1820 the United States Government had sent a secret agent to Constantinople, at the same time authorizing Commodore Bambridge, then in command of the squadron, to sound the Turkish officials on the prospects of a commercial treaty. The outbreak of the revolution interfered with their mission and the Porte repelled further advances until, in 1823, it announced its readiness to negotiate. To collect commercial information and to feel the way for formal proceedings Secretary of State Adams despatched a secret agent in the person of George B. English, an adventurer and knight errant of varied and erratic career, well acquainted with the Moslem language and customs. On reaching Constantinople English found it more convenient to communicate with the Sultan's Minister of Marine and Grand Admiral, the Capudan Pacha, than to get an audience with the prime minister, the Reis Effendi. The friendly admiral told him it would be exceedingly difficult for the two governments to negotiate at the capital, for the city was full of foreign ambassadors and intriguers, some of whom would do everything possible to discredit the United States in the eyes of the Sultan. Then the Capudan suggested the plan of himself meeting the commander of the American squadron at sea, when our Government might submit to him its proposals, and he would transmit them directly to the Sultan. In this way the European diplomats would be out-witted, and negotiations would be more speedy.

With this message English returned to America in the spring

of 1824, and urged upon President Monroe and Secretary Adams the pressing necessity of appointing someone to go immediately to meet the Grand Admiral at Gibraltar and secure protection to American interests. Not only was our commerce in jeopardy, he said, but there was grave danger of Turkish reprisals on our citizens in the Levant in consequence of the subscription from the United States in aid of the Greeks.[3]

After due deliberation on the part of the President and his advisers, Commodore Rodgers, then preparing to take charge of the Mediterranean force, was invested with authority to interview secretly the friendly Capudan. English accompanied him as interpreter.

So it was that Rodgers entered upon his cruise with a two-fold purpose; to suppress the piracy as much as was feasible, and to open up treaty negotiations with the Sublime Porte[4]. In pursuance of the latter mission he sailed directly to Symrna, where he was cordially welcomed, although it was evident that the Smyrniots were well acquainted with the trend of American sentiment

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3. Adams, Memoirs, VI, p. 414.

4. For a fuller account of Rodger's mission and cruise see Paullin's "Treaty Negotiations" Chapter 6; Commodore John Rodgers, pp. 327 28, by the same author, and for the detailed formal instructions and reports see House Document, No. 250; 22 Cong., 1 Sess., for informal account of the instructions alone see Adams, Memoirs, VI, pp. 320,358,414,442,445,447,458.

towards the revolution, and the virulent abuse heaped upon the Sultan's name. Failing to obtain news of the whereabouts of the Turkish fleet, Rodgers immediately proceeded to Napoli de Romania, the capital city of the Greeks since they had been routed from the Morea and from their recent capital, Tripolitza, by Ibrahim Pasha's army. Courtesies were interchanged with the leading Greek officials, President Conduriottis, Secretary of State Mavrocordatos, and others. The Greeks breakfasted on board Rodger's flagship, the "North Carolina", and the Commodore and his staff were in turn entertained on shore. Their relations extended no further than this exchange of civilities.

This was in the latter part of September, 1825. Leaving the sloop "Ontario" to guard the commerce in the straits, the squadron spent the winter in other parts of the sea, frequently exhibiting itself at the principal Barbary capitals. In the following June it again entered the port of Smyrna, and, learning from the United States consul, David Offley, that the Turkish fleet was near the mouth of the Dardanelles, immediately proceeded to that vicinity. There Rodgers finally succeeded in meeting the Grand Admiral on one of the islands. After the customary exchange of friendly sentiments Rodgers explained the object of his mission, stressing the fact that his government was particularly anxious to retain the existing friendly relations with the Sublime Porte and was therefore unwilling to send an envoy directly to Constantinople until assurance was given that the Sultan would willingly treat, and that on the basis of the terms given to the most favored nation.

The Admiral promised to communicate all this to his sovereign and to inform Rodgers of the outcome. Although the Porte was slow in acting and gave no reply for several years, Rodgers felt that his interview with the Capudan Pacha had not been entirely in vain, for the latter was much impressed with the strength and efficiency of our force, and in parting he even hoisted in the flag bearing the Sultan's seal, an honor which had never been shown to a European power.

All this time speculation was rife as to the business of the squadron in the eastern Mediterranean and among the islands.[5] Wiseacres at Paris delcared that the United States Government was trying to obtain an island in the Archipelago; Tunis had it that the Greeks had ceded us the island of Paros in return for promised aid in their struggle with Turkey. Lafayette, watching European accounts of the movements of our Mediterranean fleet with interest, wrote to Clay in November, 1825: "The rumors of very peculiar acts of benevolence from the American squadron and Commodore Rodgers in behalf of the Greeks, which has produced no party complaint that I know of, has in the enlightened and liberal part of the world added to the popularity and dignity of the American name. What has really passed I do not know --------,"and again in February, 1826; "I wish a respectable American fleet may again appear in those seas. My notions of the moral influence of the United States are lofty and extensive ------".

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5. Clay, Works, V, pp. 133-138. He wrote to Webster in the same vein in March, 1826. See Webster, Writings and Speeches, XVII, p. 404.

Many of the Greeks themselves, imbued as they were with reverence for America, entertained wild notions of the fleet having been sent to aid them. The following entry in Dr. Howe's journal on September, 17, 1825, suggests the ideas they sometimes gained from the most innocent movements of the squadron."News from Napoli is that an American fleet under Rodgers had arrived there: four frigates and the North Carolina, a hundred gun ship. The Greeks have a thousand ridiculous ideas about the destination of this fleet. My servant came in with eyes sparkling and mouth stretched from ear to ear. "Glory to the Holy Virgin and to God!" says he, 'Good news for Greece!'

'What says I, ' Have the fleets met?'

'No; the American ships have been to Constantinople and proposed an ambassador; but being refused, they fired upon the town and have killed many Turks; now they have arrived at Napoli, and have landed four thousand tactic troops, who will march off immediately against Ibrahim Pasha ----------'" [6]

There seems to be no breach of neutrality on the part of our forces.[7] The real diplomatic mission seems never to have been

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6. Richards, Journals and Letters of Samuel Grindley Howe, p. 119.

7. Very little of the official correspondence between the commander of the squadron and the home government has been published, and much even of the MS material is yet regarded as private, and so is not available. For historical writers, See Paullin, "Commodore Rodgers" p. 346.

suspected. The only active operations were those against the pirates, who, in spite of the efforts of the sloops "Ontario" and "Erie", succeeded in holding up two of our merchantmen, the "Susan" from Boston and the "Falcon" from New York, relieving them of some of their valuables.

Commodore William M. Crane succeeded Commodore Rodgers in command, the latter returning to the United States early in 1827. The official reports show that the fighting strength of the squadron was further increased in the spring of 1828, by the addition of two sloops.[8] An even greater number could well have been used. The Greek government had been forced in 1826 to annul its manifests of 1824 authorizing certain seizures, and for a time depredations were somewhat lessened, but the distresses of the Greeks were so great by the beginning of the year 1827 that large numbers were driven to piracy to gain even a meager means of existence, and the unprincipled of other nations more and more resorted to the use of the flag to cover their outlawry. The government of the revolutionists themselves attempted by various acts to suppress the practice,[9] but still the traffic flourished, bringing down on the heads of all the Hellenes the abuse and contempt that should have been reserved for the outlaws alone.

The correspondence of Commodore Crane[10] gives an interesting

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8. Am St. Papers, Naval Affairs, III, p. 175.

8. British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, p. 1066.

10. Am. St. Papers, Naval Affairs, III, pp. 139-140, 175-180.

account of the system of piracy being well organized as any other business or pursuit, with headquarters at Egina, the seat of the Provisional Government, with sub-stations on various islands, and commissions issued to small craft. Crete and Carabusa were the main strongholds and distributing and receiving stations for booty.[11] At one time there was some thought of taking Carabusa by force, but the forces at hand were not sufficient to warrant an attack.[12] The principal work of the squadron was, of course, that of convoying our merchant vessels to Smyrna and northern ports . The naval reports give account of many encounters, yet in spite of the combined efforts of the European navies stationed there and our own fleet, the pirates succeeded in despoiling numerous merchant ships and by all sorts of clever and daring ruses eluded the vigilance of the foreign avengers.

An interesting incident related by Captain Patterson of the United States ship "Constitution" tends to establish the conviction that our squadron was entirely neutral as regards the belligerency of Greece and Turkey, at a time when the European powers were actively participating in the struggle. -- On the 21st of October, 1827, the naval battle of Navarino between the allied squadrons of England, France, and Russia and the Ottoman fleet had taken place, resulting in the complete defeat and destruction of the latter. Shortly afterwards Captain Patterson wrote from Smyrna to Secretary of the Navy Southard: -- "news (of Navarino) reached Smyrna on

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11. Am. St. Papers, Naval Affairs, III, p. 177.

12. Ibid., III, p. 176.

the night of the 27 -------. The English, French, Dutch and Austrian vessels of war, immediately on receipt of the news ranged in line along the mareno, to facilitate embarkation of their respective subjects. This retained its original station ---- as the United States have given no cause of offence I wished to avoid even the appearance of supposing that either American citizens or property could possibly be endangered by the event that had occurred. This course was immediately remarked by the government here and gave much satisfaction".[13]

The contempt felt for the Greeks by our navy and by some American citizens in the near-by ports who failed to distinguish between this "nest of pirates", and the better class of Greek patriots was reflected in certain circles on this side of the Atlantic, there was an increasing tendency to think and talk lightly of them. But for the most part the people, many of whom had been stirred to renewed sympathy by the eloquence of Dr. Howe, were still so prejudiced in their favour that President Adams himself was cautious about attempting to push treaty negotiations with Turkey, knowing such a course would meet with popular censure.[14] But our government had not abandoned the hope of a treaty with the Porte. Throughout the winter of 1828-29 Commodore Crane and Mr. Offley were secretly interviewing the Grand Vizier. Neither party could

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13. Am.St.Papers, Naval Affairs, III, p. 140

14. Adams, Memoirs, VII, p. 463.

gain the desired concessions, and so the proceedings were discontinued. In September of 1829 President Jackson sent three commissioners to Constantinople, and finally in May, 1830, a favorable commercial treaty was arranged, which was promulgated in 1832.[15] But in the meantime hostilities had ceased in Greece and the stir in America was fast becoming a thing of the past.

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15. The account of these final negotiations is given by Paullin in his Treaty Negotiations, pp. 124 ff.

CONCLUSION

With the entrance of the Powers into the contest and the battle of Navarino, October, 1827, the last period of the war began. Activities finally ceased in 1829 and on March 22 of that year a protocol was issued which gave Greece an autonomous government but imposed a perpetual annual tribute to the Turkish Government. John Quincy Adams was watching the settlement with interest. He expressed his dissatisfaction with this condition, and with the plan of government which the European Powers had decided upon for Greece, to Baron Krudener, the Russian ambassador to the United States.[1] Greece was formed into a constitutional monarchy, but the ruler was chosen for it by Russia, France, and England, in a convention May 7, 1832, and Prince Otho of Bavaria ascended the throne. The three Powers sent a note to the United States government the month before, inviting the latter's concurrence in acknowledging Prince Otho as King of Greece. Livingston as Secretary of State answered the note, assuring the plenipotentiaries of the Powers that the United States acceded to their request.[2]

November 7, 1837, our Government formally recognized the independence of Greece by commissioning Mr. Stevenson, their minister at London, to negotiate a treaty of commerce and navigation. It was not until 1867 that a legation mission was established in Greece, however.

Years after the revolution closed, when the poet Lowell was travelling in Greece, he found the people looking on America with grateful

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1. Adams, Memoirs, VI, p. 175.

2. Moore, Digest of International Law, I, pp. 112-113.

remembrance of the assistance given in the hour of their need.[3]

Thus it was that America answered the appeal from the Greek patriots. It came at a time when the country in general was interested to international affairs. The leading statesmen were those who had pushed the war of 1812, men who were keenly alive to America's rising importance as a world power. Some leaders perhaps were pacifists such as a country always has, others vigorously militant. One wonders if perhaps Secretary of State Adams was not, in the minds of many, the man who "kept us out of war". It must certainly be said that his was the most dominant influence on the course of foreign affairs.

Then as now the people were touched by the sufferings of others and contibuted generously to the alleviation of pain. But America's time had not yet arrived, when she would throw the weight of her military strength into Old World affairs. That was saved for a later and more momentous day.

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In closing this brief review of the American reaction to the Greek cause, and the charcter of the revolution as viewed by Webster in his speech on "The great question of the age", the question between absolute and regulated governments, with his argument that as one of the people of the earth it was the clear duty of the United States to throw her influence on the side of liberalism, one cannot but recall the words of our President in his "Flag Day Address,"

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3. Everett, Oration and Speeches, IV, pp. 205-206.

June 14, 1917:

"The great fact that stands out above all the rest is that this is a people's war, a war for freedom and justice and self-government amongst all the nations of the world, a war to make the world safe for the peoples who live upon it ---- with us rests the choice to break through all these hypocrisies and patent cheats and masks of brute force and help set the world free, or else stand aside and let it be dominated by sheer weight of arms and the arbitrary choices of self-constituted masters".

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